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Checking the "Trigger-Happy" Congress:
The Extraterritorial Extension of Federal
Employment Laws Requires Prudence
DEREK G. BARELLA*
For another jurisdiction, if it should happen to lay hold of the actor, to
treat him according to its own notions rather than those of the place where
he did the acts, not only would be unjust, but would be an interference
with the authority of another sovereign, contrary to the comity of nations,
which the other state concerned justly might resent.
-Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes'
INTRODUCTION
A nation's jurisdiction to prescribe is defined as its ability "to make its law
applicable to the activities, relations, or status of persons, or the interests of
persons in things, whether by legislation, by executive act or order, by
administrative rule or regulation, or by determination of a court."2 There are
a number of bases upon which a state can claim prescriptive jurisdiction.
Generally, territoriality and nationality are the two most universally accepted
bases of jurisdiction.3 The territoriality principle represents the state's right
to regulate activity that takes place wholly or substantially within its
borders. The nationality principle is the state's right to regulate the conduct,
interests, status, or relations of its nationals, whether that conduct occurs
inside or outside of the state's territorial limits.' Extraterritorial jurisdiction,
* J.D. Candidate, 1994, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington; B.S., 1991, Ball State
University. Special thanks to my wife, Heather, for her constant encouragement and support.
1. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909) (citation omitted),
overruled by Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962).
2. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 401(a) (1986)
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
3. Id. § 402 introductory note. "Territoriality is considered the normal, and nationality an
exceptional, basis for the exercise ofjurisdiction." Id. § 402 cmt. b. Thus, in the event conflicts should
arise, international law mandates that nationality must yield to territoriality. Panel Discussion,
Jurisdictional Conflicts Arisingfrom Extratdrritorial Enforcement: The Broader Context of the Conflict,
54 ANTITRUST L.J. 787, app. B at 831 (1985) (William C. Beckett, author of appendix).
In addition to territoriality and nationality, in limited cases, prescriptive jurisdiction has been based
on other foundations. Universal jurisdiction is warranted in those cases in which the subject of the act
to be regulated is not otherwise subject to any state's jurisdiction, or in which the act in question is a
violation of a jus cogens norm of international law. For example, a state has universal jurisdiction to
prescribe punishment for offenses such as piracy, slave trade, or genocide. RESTATEMENT, supra note
2, § 404. Additionally, a state's prescriptive jurisdiction has been recognized when based oi a passive
personality interest. That is, states may regulate conduct outside of their borders and engaged in by non-
nationals for the purpose of protecting the safety of their nationals or national security. Id. § 402(3).
4. RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 402(l)(a).
5. Id. § 402(2).
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by definition, is a state's exercise of its regulatory authority over activities
taking place or persons located outside of the territorial boundaries of the
state.6 Thus, when a state extends its jurisdiction over persons or activities in
a foreign land based on nationality, or another non-territorial basis of
jurisdiction, the state is acting extraterritorially.' Since the foreign state
hosting the activity or persons sought to be regulated has jurisdiction based
on territoriality, there exists an imminent potential for conflict of laws. As the
world economy becomes more interdependent and the capitalization of foreign
markets becomes more frequent, the potential for extraterritorial application
of laws, and the corresponding potential for conflicts among laws, will
increase.
The United States has long been on the cutting edge of states pressing to
extend coverage of domestic laws beyond territorial limits. Extraterritorial
application of United States law has occurred most, often, and has caused the
most controversy, in the fields of antitrust and securities law.' In recent
6. "Extraterritorial jurisdiction" is defined as "[j]uridical power which extends beyond the physical
limits of a particular state or country." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 588 (6th ed. 1990).
7. International law does not impose an express restriction on extraterritorial jurisdiction. General
principals of international law, however, serve to limit such jurisdiction. For instance, international law
recognizes: I) the duty to refrain from interfering with the sovereignty of another state, which
necessarily includes the duty to refrain from performing acts of sovereignty within the territory of
another state, and 2) the duty to refrain from interfering with the exercise of another state's jurisdiction.
Gary Z. Nothstein & Jeffrey P. Ayres, The Multinational Corporation and the Extraterritorial
Application of the Labor Management Relations Act, 10 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1, 13 (1976); see also
Michael A. Warner, Jr., Comment, Strangers in a Strange Land: Foreign Compulsion and the
Extraterritorial Application of United States Employment Law, 11 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 371, 372
(1990) (noting that the modem approach is to supplement rigid territoriality concepts with notions of
reasonableness and fairness).
8. Extraterritorial application of federal antitrust and securities laws has long been a source of
friction between the United States and foreign governments. Even traditional allies such as Great Britain
have been outspoken in their disapproval of "American Imperialism." David J. Gerber, Beyond
Balancing: International Law Restraints on the Reach of National Laws, 10 YALE J. INT'L L. 185, 188
(1984). Foreign states have gone so far as to engage in retaliation against the United States. Such
retaliation usually has taken one of three forms:
1) One of the milder forms of retaliation has simply been diplomatic protest. This protest has at times
risen to the level of public admonitions, and in some cases has resulted in a foreign government
appearing before United States courts to plead restraint in the application of American antitrust laws.
Id. at 187.
2) In some cases, threats, sanctions, and other forms of economic coercion have been applied against
American corporations abroad in response to transnational application of United States laws:
In the economic sphere, other countries are expressing resistance to U.S. companies'
participation in projects thought likely to be subject to U.S. extraterritorial controls. Some
foreign manufacturers are shifting to non-U.S. sources of supply for long-term industrial
projects or export-oriented manufacturing. This is affecting U.S. companies' participation in
joint ventures as well as their sales abroad .... The political and economic implications are
so significant that they could become a bigger threat to American economic interests than the
present concerns about tariffs, quotas, and exchange rates.
Kenneth W. Dam, Economic and Political Aspects of Extraterritoriality, Address Before the Comm. on
International Aspects of Antitrust Law of the International Section of the American Bar Association,
(April 16, 1985), in CURRENT POLICY NO. 697, Mar. 5, 1985, at 2.
3) Finally, some foreign states have adopted legislation designed to thwart the extraterritorial
application of United States laws. Typically this type of legislation takes one of three forms. "Blocking"
statutes prohibit cooperation with American legal proceedings, particularly with respect to discovery
orders. "Drawback" or "clawbacek" statutes expressly deny national recognition of certain foreign
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years, however, the issue has arisen again as to whether United States labor
and employment laws can be, and should be, applied extraterritorially. 9 This
Note will evaluate the prudence of extending the coverage of United States
employment laws overseas, focusing particularly on the National Labor
Relations Act ("NLRA" or "Act"). Part I reviews the historical presumption
against extraterritoriality that has been applied to employment laws. Using this
historical discussion as a backdrop, Part II examines recent congressional
developments that have revived the issue of transnational application of
United States employment laws. More specifically, Part II considers the
amendments to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and to Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964-amendments that made those two acts
applicable to United States companies employing Americans abroad.' ° Part
II also looks at the Workplace Democracy Act of 1992 ("WDA")," which
was introduced in the House of Representatives on September 25, 1992. The
WDA was referred to the House Education and Labor Committee on the date
of its proposal, and was not reported out of committee. The WDA had as its
primary purpose the securing of collective bargaining rights for public
employees. In addition, the WDA called for the amendment of the National
Labor Relations Act in order to apply its provisions extraterritorially. Part III
discusses why this proposed extension of the NLRA to American employers
located abroad would cause practical administrative difficulties for the
National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB" or "Board") and diplomatic
difficulties for the United States Government. Finally, Part IV proposes a new
test for courts to employ when considering the extraterritorial application of
federal employment laws.
I. THE EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF EMPLOYMENT LAWS
A. The American Banana Dam Against Extraterritoriality
The United States Supreme Court first considered the extraterritorial
application of a federal statute in American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.' 2
judgments. And finally, "secrecy" laws impose duties of confidentiality upon foreign nationals. Secrecy
laws thereb end up frustrating the extraterritorial application of United States laws in much the same
manner as blocking laws. RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 442 reporters' notes 1 & 4; Gerber, supra at
187; James M. Zimmerman, Extraterritorial Application of Federal Labor Laws: Congress's Flawed
Extension of the ADEA, 21 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 103, 120-23 (1988); Note, Predictability and Comity:
Toward Common Principles of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 98 HARV. L. REv. 1310, 1311 (1985).
9. This revival has been a direct result of the congressional amendment of two widely publicized
employment laws, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964. Both amendments were passed in order to explicitly extend the coverage of those acts to
encompass American employees working for United States based companies outside of the United
States. See discussion infra parts II.A, II.B.
10. This Note uses the terms "abroad" and "overseas" to refer to foreign states generally. Thus,
those terms are meant to include Canada, Mexico, and other foreign nations that are not necessarily
"overseas."
11. H.R. 6041, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992).
12. American Banana, 213 U.S. 347 (1909), overruled by Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide
& Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962). The fact that the Court was not acquainted with cases arguing
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At issue in American Banana was the Sherman Anti-Trust Act and, in
particular, the United Fruit Company's alleged unlawful monopoly of the
Costa Rican banana market. 3 The Court, through Justice Holmes, issued a
virtual per se rule against extraterritorial application of federal statutes. 4
Justice Holmes' opinion was largely a creature of its time, a time in which
non-territorial bases of jurisdiction were not as widely accepted as they are
today. In this light, it is important to note that Justice Holmes' opinion
focused on whether Congress had the authority to regulate activities abroad
at all, rather than concentrating on whether Congress actually intended the
Sherman Act to be applied extraterritorially. Justice Holmes stated that "the
general and almost universal rule is that the character of an act as lawful or
unlawful must be determined wholly by the law of the country where the act
is done."" Therefore, "in case of doubt . . . . '[a]ll legislation is prima facie
territorial.""' 6 Again, this conclusion was warranted by the then-prevailing
view that territoriality was the predominant base of jurisdiction. For a state
to regulate conduct outside of its boundaries, it would run the risk of
interfering with the sovereignty of another nation, thereby violating interna-
tional law.'7
B. The Cracks in the Dam
American Banana acted as an effective dam to extraterritoriality for the next
two decades.'" In the 1930's, however, the absolutist view of territoriality
began to soften, and states, particularly the United States, began to realize the
need to continue to exercise some control over their citizens, even while those
citizens were located outside the state's boundaries.' 9 Consequently, cracks
in the dam began to appear.20 The two largest cracks were representative of
a more widely accepted recognition of non-territorial bases of prescriptive
the extraterritorial application of United States laws is evident from the majority opinion:
It is obvious that, however stated, the plaintiff's case depends on several rather startling
propositions. In the first place, the acts causing the damage were done, so far as appears,
outside the jurisdiction of the United States and within that of other states. It is surprising to
hear it argued that they were governed by the act of Congress.
Id. at 355.
13. Id. at 354-55.
14. Id. at 357.
15. Id. at 356 (citation omitted).
16. Id. at 357 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Exparte Blain, 1879 Ch. 522, 528
(Eng., C.A.)).
17. Id. at 356.
18. Jonathan Turley, "When in Rome": Multinational Misconduct and the Presumption Against
Extraterritoriality, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 598, 604 (1990).
19. Note, Constructing the State Extraterritorially: Jurisdictional Discourse, the National Interest,
and Transnational Norms, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1273, 1276 (1990) [hereinafter Constructing the State
Extraterritorially].
20. Turley, supra note 18, at 604-08. One commentator has described the "loudfl and unneces-
sary[]" rule of American Banana as "an albatross which the Court has struggled to remove almost ever
since [its creation]." David P. Currie, Flags of Convenience, American Labor, and the Conflict of Laws,
1963 Sup. CT. REv. 34, 57.
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jurisdiction and an expanded view as to what constituted prescriptive
jurisdiction under the territorial principle itself.2'
Blackmer v. United States,22 illustrates the first crack in the dam. In
Blackmer, the Court declined overruling the presumption against extraterritori-
ality pronounced in American Banana. Nonetheless, the Court softened the
rule by expressly recognizing nationality as a valid basis for exerting
jurisdiction.23 In so doing, the Court stated "the question of [a statute's]
application, so far as citizens of the United States in foreign countries are
concerned, is one of construction, not of legislative power. '24 The Court
found Congress' authority to legislate extraterritorially, at least with respect
to American citizens, to be clearly authorized under international law.
25
Given that Congress had such authority, the Court identified the real issue as
being whether Congress indeed intended for the particular law in question to
extend transnationally.2 6 The presumption was changed from a virtually
irrebuttable one that focused on the authority of Congress, to a rebuttable one
that focused on the intent of Congress.
The rationale given by the Court for the presumption is two-fold. The first
rationale stems from conflicts principles that were first announced by Chief
Justice Marshall in 1804.27 "[AIn act of congress ought never to be construed
to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains, and
consequently, can never be construed to violate neutral rights, or to affect
neutral commerce, farther than is warranted by the law of nations."28 Under
this canon of construction, the courts, whenever possible, will construe an act
of Congress in such a way as to avoid potential international conflicts.
The second rationale was formally stated by the Court in Foley Bros. v.
Filardo.29 The Court reasoned that Congress, when legislating, is primarily
concerned with domestic matters.3" This second rationale has been especially
influential upon the courts when considering the transnational application of
labor and employment laws. It has been stated that "[i]t is more likely for a
statute with an international focus, such as the Trading with the Enemy Act,
to be interpreted as having extraterritorial reach than it is for a statute with
a domestic focus, such as the National Labor Relations Act, to be so
interpreted."'"
21. Turley, supra note 18, at 604-05 & n.42.
22. Blackmer, 284 U.S. 421 (1932).
23. Id. at 436.
24. Id. at 437.
25. Id. at 437 n.2 ("'The law of Nations does not prevent a State from exercising jurisdiction over
its subjects travelling or residing abroad, since they remain under its personal supremacy."') (citing
several international scholarly works) (quoting 1 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW § 145, at 281 (4th
ed.)).
26. Id. at 437.
27. See Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804).
28. Id. at 118.
29. Foley Bros., 336 U.S. 281 (1949).
30. Turley, supra note 18, at 607.
31. George A. Zaphiriou, Basis of the Conflict of Laws: Fairness and Effectiveness, 10 GEO.
MASON U. L. Rav. 301, 322-23 (1988) (citations omitted); see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 403
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The second crack in the dam was an expanded view of the territorial
principle. Often termed the "effects doctrine," or "objective territoriality," this
view recognized the authority of a state to regulate conduct outside of its
territorial boundaries that has or is intended to have substantial territorial
effects.32 Judge Learned Hand, writing for the Second Circuit in United
States v. Aluminum Co. of America,33 adopted this doctrine in recognizing
the extraterritoriality of the Sherman Act in 1945.3 Judge Hand stated that
if conduct abroad had "intended and actual" or "foreseeable and substantial"
effects within the state, then prescriptive jurisdiction was established. 5
Initially, the effects doctrine was widely criticized by other states. "Some
countries viewed the effects doctrine as akin to 'imperialism' and chose not
to recognize the doctrine. 3s6 United States courts continued to apply the
doctrine in antitrust cases, however, until 1976 when the Ninth Circuit slightly
modified the doctrine in Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, N.T. &
S.A. 37 The Timberlane opinion augmented the effects doctrine by establishing
a balancing test that weighs the interests of the United States against the
interests of other nations that might be affected by the extraterritorial
application of a United States law.38 This balancing approach in turn has
been widely criticized, 3  but has nonetheless been accepted by a number of
circuit courts, and the American Legal Institute.4" Today the effects doctrine,
in one form or another, is begrudgingly accepted by most of the international
community."
C. The Modern Presumption Against Extraterritoriality
The modern analysis of statutes has diverged down one of the two cracks
depending upon the nature of the statute in question. 42 Antitrust and
reporters' note 2.
32. RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 402 cmt. d.
33. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
34. Id. at 443-44.
35. Id.
36. Zimmerman, supra note 8, at 110 & n.39; see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 402
reporters' note 2; LOUIS HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 829-30 (2d ed.
1987); Edward Gordon, Extraterritorial Application of United States Economic Laws: Britain Draws
the Line, 14 INT'L LAw. 151, 153 (Winter 1980).
37. Timberlane, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976), on remand, 574 F. Supp. 1453 (N.D. Cal. 1983),
aff'd, 749 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1032 (1985).
38. Id. at 609, 613; see Gordon, supra note 36, at 158.
39. See, e.g., Gerber, supra note 8, at 205-06.
40. RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 403.
41. Id. § 403 reporters' note 3; see also Monroe Leigh, Export Administration Act-Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction over Foreign Incorporated Subsidiary of U.S. Parent Company-Claim of U.S. Jurisdiction
Rejected in Netherlands Court, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 636 (1983).
42. Professor Jonathan Turley has described the courts' bifurcated analysis of statutes by
distinguishing between "market" and "nonmarket" statutes. Professor Turley contends that the courts
more readily "grant extraterritorial relief under 'market statutes,' like the antitrust and securities laws
that are primarily intended to protect market interests-even though [the courts] acknowledge that the
statutes are silent on whether such application was intended by Congress." On the other hand, labor and
employment laws, which regulate less traditional markets, receive less favorable treatment because they
[Vol. 69:889
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securities statutes have received wide extraterritorial application.43 When
considering these types of statutes, courts have focused on the expanded
territoriality concept and have concluded that potential territorial effects
warrant extraterritorial application." Indeed, consideration of the extraterrito-
riality of antitrust or securities statutes under the effects doctrine or the
modified effects doctrine, as espoused in Timberlane, has often boiled down
to a simple interest balancing test.45  Moreover, courts have generously
weighted the United States' interest in maintaining the purity of its trade and
securities markets. Thus, foreign interests have submitted to American ones
in the courts' balancing, and consequently federal antitrust and securities laws
have been applied expansively across the globe.46
Employment laws generally have not been examined under the enhanced
territoriality concept,4 but instead have been considered to be extraterritorial
in application only if they could be based on the nationality principle. 8
Therefore, the focus in employment cases has not been on the policy
considerations underlying transnational application of the law in question but
instead has been on whether Congress has evidenced the requisite intent to
are essentially "nonmarket statutes." Turley, supra note 18, at 601. The term "nonmarket" "is meant to
reflect a conceptual bias in extraterritorial cases that favor antitrust and securities laws because of their
express statutory purpose of preserving competitive markets." Id. at n.16.
Professor Turley's article goes on to list three possible distinctions between "market" and
"nonmarket" statutes that might be the underlying cause of their disparate treatment. The distinctions
discussed are: 1) an effects distinction, 2) an intrusiveness distinction, and 3) an interests distinction.
Id. at 638-55.
43. Id. at 608-17.
44. See supra notes 32-41 and accompanying text.
45. Zimmerman, supra note 8, at 110.
46. Turley, supra note 18, at 608-17.
47. The balancing of interests theory was utilized for a short time by the NLRB when considering
application of the NLRA to cases with international contacts. The Supreme Court expressly rejected that
balancing approach in McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10 (1963):
[T]o follow such a suggested procedure to the ultimate might require that the Board inquire
into the internal discipline and order of all foreign vessels calling at American ports. Such
activity would raise considerable disturbance not only in the field of maritime law but in our
intemational relations as well. In addition, enforcement of Board orders would project the
courts into application of the sanctions of the Act to foreign-flag ships on a purely ad hoc
weighing of contacts basis. This would inevitably lead to embarrassment in foreign affairs and
be entirely infeasible in actual practice.
Id. at 19; see also Harold G. Maier, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction at a Crossroads: An Intersection
Between Public and Private International Law, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 280, 308 (1982); Nothstein & Ayres,
supra note 7, at 31.
In Part II.C., this Note will question whether the courts have actually rejected the effects doctrine with
respect to employment laws, and in particular with respect to their consideration of the transnational
scope of the National Labor Relations Act.
48. But see Lea Brilmayer, The Extraterritorial Application of American Law: A Methodological
and Constitutional Appraisal, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. I 1 (Summer 1987); Friedrich K. Juenger,
Constitutional Control of Extraterritoriality?: A Comment on Professor Brilmayer's Appraisal, 50 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBs. 39 (Summer 1987). Professors Brilmayer and Juenger contend that "judicial
recourse to an unexpressed legislative intent in determining the reach of domestic law amounts to mere
windowdressing." Id. at 39. Questions of extraterritoriality arise because Congress failed to address that
issue when enacting the particular statute to begin with. Professor Juenger draws out the proposition
further by stating that "[ift is doubtless correct to say that when courts profess to honor the wishes of
Congress, they in fact follow their own normative views concerning the desirable scope of American
regulatory legislation." Id. at 40.
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apply the law extraterritorially.49 In other words, while the authority of
Congress to enact transnational employment laws has been widely recognized,
the courts have required proof of the affirmative intent of Congress to extend
the law in question overseas. Such intent has rarely been found."
The test for effective rebuttal of the presumption in employment law cases
further has been split into two prongsi' If the statute is one that, if applied
extraterritorially, is likely to interfere with international diplomacy and
relations, the statute will be deemed territorial unless a "clear statement" of
contrary congressional intent can be found. 2 If applying the statute
extraterritorially would not give rise to imminent foreign relations conflicts,
however, the standard is weaker. In these non-confrontational cases, the intent
of Congress to apply a law abroad can be found in either the statutory
language or its history. 3
When analyzing each particular employment statute for extraterritorial
reach, the courts have not always been clear about which tier of the
presumption they were applying. Whichever tier was being used, however, the
courts have consistently denied extraterritorial application to almost every
employment law they have considered. 4 Those laws that have been held to
possess "territorial application only" include: the Labor Management Relations
Act," the National Labor Relations Act, 6 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964,"7 the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,58 the Eight Hour
49. Michael L. Goldberg, Labor Relations and Labor Standards for Employees of United States
Enterprises Working in Foreign Areas, 48 N.D. L. REv. 23, 26 (1971); Turley, supra note 18, at 617-18.
50. Cleary v. United States Lines, Inc., 555 F. Supp. 1251, 1262-63 (D.N.J. 1983) ("Generally, this
country's labor laws have been construed to preclude extraterritorial application."); Goldberg, supra note
49, at 36; Turley, supra note 18, at 627; Zimmerman, supra note 8, at 106; Warner, supra note 7, at
387.
51. Jacqueline E. Bailey, Note, Title VII Protections Do Not Extend to Americans Working
Overseas: EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., III S. Ct. 1227 (1991), 5 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 417,423
(1992); Janelle M. Diller, Note, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Multinational
Enterprise, 73 GEo. L.J. 1465, 1476 (1985); Conly J. Schulte, Case Note, Americans Employed Abroad
by United States Firms Are Denied Protection Under Title VII: EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co.,
25 CREiGHToN L. REV. 351, 361 (1991).
52. See supra note 51.
53. See supra note 5 1.
54. See supra note 51.
55. Labor-Management Relations Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1988)); see infra part II.C.
56. Naional Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 151-169 (1988)); see infra part II.C.
57. Civil Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988)); see infra part II.B.
58. Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (1967) (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988)); see infra part II.A.
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Law,59 the Federal Employers' Liability Act,60 and the Railway Labor
Act.
6
'
Virtually the only employment law to receive favorable extraterritorial
application is the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA").62 The Court in
Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connel 63 held that congressional intent to apply the
FLSA to a military base in Bermuda could be inferred from the language in
the statute governing "possessions" of the United States.64 The Court
reasoned that the leased property on which the base was located qualified as
a possession of the United States.65
In Foley Bros. v. Filardo,66 decided only three months after Vermilya-
Brown, the Court refused to find the Federal Eight Hour Law applicable to a
contract between the United States and a private contractor for construction
59. Eight Hour Law, ch. 174, 37 Stat. 137 (1912), repealed by Pub. L. No. 87-581, 6 Stat. 360
(1962); see infra notes 67-71 and accompanying text.
60. Federal Employers' Liability Act, ch. 149,35 Stat. 65 (1908) (codified as amended at 45 U.S.C.
§§ 51-60 (1988)). In New York Cent. R.R. Co. v. Chisholm, 268 U.S. 29 (1925), an American citizen
was employed by the defendant railroad and suffered fatal injuries while working on a passenger train
located in Canada, 30 miles north of the United States border. The decedent's administrator brought suit
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act ("FELA"). FELA declares that common carriers by railroad,
while engaging in interstate or foreign commerce, shall be liable for damages caused to employees
resulting from the carrier's negligence. The Court held that there was no evidence that Congress
intended FELA to apply extraterritorially. The plaintiff's only recourse was to seek relief under Canadian
law. Id. at 31.
Despite the fact that the Court noted a lack of congressional intent to apply FELA extraterritorially,
Chisholm was not exactly governed by the modem presumption approach. At the time Chisholm was
decided, American Banana was still the prevailing view, and in fact the Chisholm Court cited American
Banana approvingly. Id. at 32. Thus, at the time of this decision, territoriality was still seen as the
greatly preferred, and indeed was still cited by many as the only, basis for exerting prescriptive
jurisdiction. This theory, not a lack of congressional intent, was most likely the primary justification for
the Court's holding in Chisholm.
61. Railway Labor Act, ch. 347, 44 Stat. 577 (1926) (codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-163
(1988)). In Air Line Dispatchers Ass'n v. National Mediation Bd., 189 F.2d 685 (1951), the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed a decision of the National Mediation Board holding that the
Railway Labor Act ("RLA") was intended to be strictly territorial in scope. In that case the Air Line
Dispatchers Association, a labor organization, had filed an application with the National Mediation
Board for an investigation of an alleged representation dispute among the flight dispatchers of Pan
American-Grace Airways, Inc. The Board, noting that the company and the dispatchers in question
operated solely outside the United States, dismissed the application on the ground that the RLA did not
apply to the dispute. Id. at 687. The affirmance by the court in this case was made easy, as the terms
and history of the RLA clearly point to the fact that its provisions were meant to apply to carriers
engaged in interstate and foreign transportation only "'so far as such transportation ... takes place
within the United States."' Id. at 690 (quoting 49 U.S.C.A. §§ l(1)(c), 1(2)).
The court then considered the 1936 amendments to the RLA that extended the RLA to air carriers
"'engaged in interstate or foreign commerce."' Id. (quoting 45 U.S.C.A. § 181). The court concluded
by reference to another section in the RLA, and to the legislative history of the amendments, that the
amendments were only intended to cover air carriers to the extent rail carriers were covered under the
original RLA. Id. Thus, the court concluded that in all respects, the RLA was strictly territorial in its
scope.
62. Fair Labor Standards Act, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§
201-209 (1988)).
63. Vermilya-Brown, 335 U.S. 377 (1948).
64. Id. at 390.
65. Id.
66. Foley Bros., 336 U.S. 281 (1949).
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work to be performed in a foreign country.6 7 The Court reached this
conclusion despite the fact that the relevant provisions of the Eight Hour Law
were "indistinguishable in effect" from the FLSA provisions that the Court
had just considered in Vermilya-Brown.65 Justice Frankfurter, concurring in
the Foley Bros. judgment, noted the inconsistent results in the two cases:
"Because the decision in Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell, . . . was one of
statutory interpretation, I would feel bound by it were it not still open because
rendered at this Term. If I felt bound by it, I would be obliged to dissent in
this case. '"69 Justice Frankfurter, who had joined the dissenting Justice
Jackson in Vermilya-Brown,70 went on to restate the arguments mandating
strictly territorial application of both the FLSA and the Eight Hour Law.71
Congress amended the FLSA in 1957 to reverse the Court's decision in
Vermilya-Brown.72 The purpose of the amendments was "to exclude from any
possible coverage of the Fair Labor Standards Act work performed by
employees in a workplace within a foreign country. 73 Congress gave a
number of reasons for intentionally limiting the reach of the FLSA. In
particular, Congress cited the fact that the payment of United States minimum
wages in certain foreign countries was disturbing the local economies "by
drawing workers away from vital tasks and by conceivably making recruit-
ment of workers to these desirable jobs on the overseas bases a subject of
local political interest. '74 Further, in order to comply with local laws,
defense contractors had been forced to violate the FLSA in their foreign
operations. The Department of Defense, in order to facilitate operations, had
underwritten the contractors against any FLSA liability and now the
Department stood to pay millions of dollars in retroactive liability.75 Finally,
Congress recognized "[t]he desirability of allowing the Government to
continue its present procedures of establishing employment standards through
negotiation and agreement with the governments of the areas involved. 7 6
67. Id. at 284-85.
68. Id. at 292 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); see also Zimmerman, supra note 8, at 114.
69. Foley Bros., 336 U.S. at 291 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
70. Vermilya-Brown, 335 U.S. at 409 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
71. Foley Bros., 336 U.S. at 292-94 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). In particular, Justice Frankfurter
was concerned that the statute might interfere with contracts in existence between United States
contractors and foreign laborers. Additionally, Justice Frankfurter's concurrence in Foley Bros. reprinted
a letter of the Wage and Hour Administrator, the person principally responsible for enforcing the
Vermilya-Brown decision. Id. at 296-300. The Administrator had written that "even if I should be able
to reach sound conclusions as to the application of the [FLSA] in these areas, I cannot help but foresee
fundamental administrative difficulties in attempting to apply the Act in 'possessions' over which the
United States does not exercise full sovereign rights." Id. at 299. Finally, Justice Frankfurter noted that
he would have preferred a clear statement of purpose from Congress before holding a statute to
"'regulate labor conditions which are the primary concern of a foreign country."' Id. at 291 (quoting the
majority opinion at 286). Justice Frankfurter stated that "[w]e should not, in the absence of an explicit
declaration of policy, assume that Congress meant to impose our domestic standards of employment
upon peoples who are not generally subject to the regulatory power of Congress." Id. at 292.
72. Pub. L. No. 85-231, 71 Stat. 514 (1957) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 213(0 (1988)).
73. S. REP. No. 987, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1957).
74. Id. at 3.
75. H.R. REp. No. 808, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1957).
76. Id.
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The cases previously discussed evidence courts' reluctance to extend
coverage of federal employment laws overseas. Their hesitancy is largely
predicated on a desire to avoid stepping on internationally sovereign toes, and
by a belief that Congress is primarily concerned with domestic affairs.
Following the Vermilya-Brown decision, Congress, in its amendment of the
FLSA, could be said to have voiced its approval of the courts' conservative
stance in this area. However, instances in recent years suggest that such
congressional approval could be waning. To be more specific, Congress has
amended two employment laws, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
("ADEA") and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), to
expressly ensure their extraterritorial reach.7" Some commentators suggest
that amendment of a third labor statute, the National Labor Relations Act,
might not, and some would argue, should not, be far behind. 8
II. REVIVAL OF AN ISSUE ONCE THOUGHT TO BE DEAD
Much of the debate surrounding the extraterritorial application of United
States employment laws has come from the courts' consideration of the
ADEA, Title VII, and the NLRA. Utilizing the presumption, the courts have
refused to apply any of these statutes extraterritorially, and have thereby
prompted Congress to act. In 1984, Congress amended the ADEA,79 and, in
1991, it amended the Civil Rights Act.8 ° In both cases, the amendments
made explicit Congress' intent that the laws be applied extraterritorially.8 '
While some commentaries have suggested a similar amendment to the
NLRA,82 Congress remained quiet on the issue until September 25, 1992. On
that date, Representative Bernard Sanders (D-VT) introduced the Workplace
Democracy Act of 1992.83 The primary purpose of the WDA was to
guarantee the right of public employees to organize and bargain collective-
ly.8 4 However, section Three, "Application of Act," stated:
The provisions of the National Labor Relations Act shall apply to
United States companies and their subsidiaries operating in any country
that is a signatory to a Free Trade Agreement. Workers of such companies
and subsidiaries shall have the right to file unfair labor practice complaints
77. See infra notes 92-95, 113-15 and accompanying text.
78. See, e.g., Jeffrey K. Ross, American Legal Restrictions on the Use of Union Economic Weapons
Against Multinational Employers, 10 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 59, 84 n.130 (1976).
79. Pub. L. No. 98-459, 98 Stat. 1792 (1984) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 630(f) (1988)).
80. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) ("With respect to employment in a foreign country,
[the term 'employee') includes an individual who is a citizen of the United States." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
(f) (Supp. m 1991)).
81. Renee S. Orleans, Note, Extraterritorial Employment Protection Amendments of 1991: Congress
Protects U.S. Citizens Who Workfor U.S. Companies Abroad, 16 MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 147, 159-60
(1992).
82. See Ross, supra note 78, at 84 n.130.
83. H.R. 6041, supra note 11.
84. Id. § 2(a).
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against the United States parent company under this Act and under the laws
of the signatory country. 5
The WDA was never reported out of the House Education and Labor
Committee; however, amending the NLRA to expand its coverage to American
citizens working overseas for United States companies or subsidiaries still
remains possible.
A. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act
Prior to its amendment, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act was
consistently denied extraterritorial application by the courts. In the leading
case on the matter, Cleary v. United States Lines, Inc.,6 the petitioner,
Francis Cleary, had worked for his American employer, United States Lines,
for thirty-three years. The last two-thirds of his employment had been spent
in Europe, with the last twelve years of service in London. When United
States Lines terminated Mr. Cleary, he was told that the dismissal was due to
structural reorganization. Later, the company said it fired Mr. Cleary due to
poor job performance. Mr. Cleary claimed that both of the stated reasons were
pretextual, and that actually he was terminated because of his age. Conse-
quently, he filed a discrimination claim under the ADEA.1
7
The Third Circuit agreed with the district court's conclusion that the
enforcement provisions of the amended FLSA were incorporated into the
ADEA. 88 The court reasoned, since the FLSA by its terms did not apply
outside of the territory of the United States, ergo the ADEA did not either.89
In support of its holding, the district court also found significant the fact that
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"),the administrative
agency charged with carrying out the provisions of the ADEA,was neither
equipped nor empowered to function abroad. 90 The Third Circuit agreed with
the district court's analysis and affirmed the holding on appeal. 9'
85. Id. § 3.
86. Cleary, 555 F. Supp. 1251 (D.N.J. 1983), af'd, 728 F.2d 607 (3d Cir. 1984).
87. Cleary, 728 F.2d at 608.
88. Id.
89. To be specific, the court noted:
Section 7 of the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 626, provides that "[t]he provisions of this chapter shall
be enforced in accordance with the powers, remedies, and procedures provided in sections 211
(b), 216 [except for subdivision (a) thereof] and 217 of this title." The provisions referenced
are part of the FLSA. Section 16(d), 29 U.S.C. § 216(d), provides that "no employer shall be
subject to any liability or punishment ... on account of his failure to comply with any
provision of such Acts (1) with respect to work ... performed in a workplace to which the
exception in section 13(f) of this title is applicable." Section 13(f), 29 U.S.C. § 213(f), in turn
provides that the acts covered by it shall not apply "to any employee whose services during
the workweek are performed in a workplace within a foreign country."
Id.
90. Cleary, 555 F. Supp. at 1259.
91. Cleary, 728 F.2d at 610.
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After Cleary, Congress began to investigate the merits of extending the
ADEA extraterritorially. 92 In hearings on the matter, the goals of both the
ADEA and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 were discussed.
Together, the two laws were designed to completely eliminate discrimination
in the workplace.93 Noting that Title VII applied extraterritorially, which was
the prevailing view at the time, Clarence Thomas, then chairperson of the
EEOC, argued along with others that the ADEA should be amended so that
it too would protect Americans working abroad. 94 The position championed
by Thomas and the EEOC prevailed and, in 1984, the Older Americans Act
Amendments were passed, explicitly authorizing the extraterritorial application
of the ADEA.9' Congress carefully limited the amendments so as not to
apply to foreign nationals or foreign-based companies. Further, the amend-
ments provided that the ADEA would not be enforced in cases where
compliance with its provisions would force a United States company or
subsidiary to violate the laws of the host country.96
Following the amendments, the courts struck one final blow to the issue of
whether the ADEA protected Americans abroad. In S.F. DeYoreo v. Bell
Helicopter Textron, Inc.97 and Pfeiffer v. Win. Wrigley Jr. Co.,98 the Fifth
and Seventh Circuits refused the respective plaintiffs relief under the ADEA
for alleged discrimination that occurred overseas.99 While the complaints
were filed after the amendment of the ADEA, the alleged discrimination
occurred prior to the amendment, and the courts refused to apply the Older
Americans Act Amendments retroactively.' 0 Judge Posner's opinion in
Pfeiffer exemplifies the hesitancy exhibited by the courts when considering
the transnational application of federal employment statutes. Despite the
recent ADEA amendments, ninety percent of Judge Posner's opinion was used
to carefully illuminate the concerns of the judiciary that have underlain the
92. Age Discrimination and Overseas Americans, 1983: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Aging
of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. 1 (1983).
93. Id. at 2-3.
94. Id. passim.
95. Older Americans Act Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-459, § 802, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. (98
Stat.) 1767, 1792-93 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 623, 630, 631). The amendments add the following
language to the ADEA definition of employee: "The term 'employee' includes any individual who is
a citizen of the United States employed by an employer in a workplace in a foreign country."
Zimmerman, supra note 8, at 117 (citing Older Americans Act Amendments of 1984, supra).
96. Louise P. Zanar, Note, Recent Amendments to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 19
GEo. WASH. J. INT'L L. & EcON. 165, 187 (1985). In effect, the amendments to the ADEA expressly
reserve for American companies what is known as the foreign sovereign compulsion defense. The
foreign compulsion defense has long been recognized by United States courts in cases where a defendant
can show that in order to comply with the law of the country in which it was located, it was forced to
engage in conduct that was violative of United States law. The historical problem with the defense has
been that it has been accepted in some cases and rejected in others, with no clear guidelines being
established to guide future conduct. For a good discussion of the defense, see generally Warner, supra
note 7.
97. DeYoreo, 785 F.2d 1282 (5th Cir. 1986).
98. Pfeiffer, 755 F.2d 554 (7th Cir. 1985).
99. DeYoreo, 785 F.2d at 1283; Pfeiffer, 755 F.2d at 559.
100. DeYoreo, 785 F.2d at 1283; Pfeiffer, 755 F.2d at 559-60.
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presumption against extraterritoriality.' 0 ' Finally, in the last paragraph of his
opinion, Judge Posner recognized the 1984 amendments and then quickly
dismissed them as nonretroactive.10 2
B. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
Meanwhile, contrary to the ADEA, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
had been consistently interpreted by federal district courts as applying to
Americans working abroad for United States companies.' 0 3 However, in
1991, the Supreme Court considered the case of Mr. Ali Boureslan, an
American citizen working for the Arabian American Oil Company ("Aram-
co"), a Delaware corporation, at its plant in Saudi Arabia.0 4 Mr. Boureslan
claimed he was fired on the bases of his race, religion, and national origin.
Consequently, he sought relief under Title VII.' The Supreme Court, in an
opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, held that Mr. Boureslan had no claim
under Title VII because the statute contained no language to suggest that
Congress intended it to be applied extraterritorially.0 6 "We assume that
Congress legislates against the backdrop of the presumption against extraterri-
toriality. Therefore, unless there is 'the affirmative intention of the Congress
clearly expressed,' we must presume it 'is primarily concerned with domestic
conditions."" 07 The presumption of territoriality, the majority reasoned,
"serves to protect against unintended clashes between our laws and those of
other nations which could result in international discord."'0 8
Justice Marshall's dissent criticized the majority for both abandoning the
two-tiered rebuttable presumption test and for establishing a clear statement
rule for all employment laws.0 9 "[T]he Court has until now recognized that
[the clear statement test is] reserved for settings in which the extraterritorial
application of a statute would 'implicat[e] sensitive issues of the authority of
the Executive over relations with foreign nations."' 0 Justice Marshall cited
the National Labor Relations Act as an example of such a law that, if applied
extraterritorially, would very possibly implicate sensitive foreign relations
issues."' Title VII, on the other hand, if applied strictly to American
employees working abroad for United States employers, would cause no
101. Pfeiffer, 755 F.2d at 557 ("The fear of outright collisions between domestic and foreign
law-collisions both hard on the people caught in the cross-fire and a potential source of friction
between the United States and foreign countries-lies behind the presumption against the extraterritorial
application of federal statutes.").
102. Id. at 559-60; see also Turley, supra note 18, at 625.
103. Orleans, supra note 81, at 152 & n.53.
104. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), It1 S. Ct. 1227 (1991).
105. Id. at 1230.
106. Id. at 1236.
107. Id. at 1230 (citations omitted) (quoting Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138,
147 (1957) and Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949)).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1237-46 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 1239 (quoting NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490, 500 (1979)).
111. Id.
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friction with foreign relations."2 Therefore, the dissent reasoned that Title
VII should be subject to the "weak" tier of the presumption. The weak tier
was satisfied, Justice Marshall concluded, because congressional intent to
apply Title VII extraterritorially could clearly be ascertained from examining
together both the statute's language, legislative history, and administrative
interpretations.
13
Congress overturned the Aramco decision with the Civil Rights Act of
1991."14 The amendment language extending Title VII's reach overseas was
patterned almost directly after the Older Americans Act of 1984.15 It too
is limited in its scope, expressly allowing the defense of foreign sovereign
compulsion.' 
1 6
C. The National Labor Relations Act
The extraterritorial application of the NLRA has been considered by the
NLRB and the courts under several different factual settings. Though the
language of the Act itself appears to grant wide jurisdictional authority to the
NLRB,"17 courts have consistently denied such jurisdiction in cases that
have involved significant foreign elements.
Because the cases dealing with the NLRA's transnational reach involve
diverse fact patterns, it is difficult to determine the precedential value of each
case's holding. The process is further complicated by the many different
decision-makers that are involved, namely the Supreme Court, the lower
federal courts, and the NLRB. Indeed, some commentators have suggested that
the "true" issue of whether the NLRA extends extraterritorially has yet to be
determined." 8 To keep the cases straight and to ascertain what future
112. Id. at 1239-40.
113. Id. at 1246.
114. Pub. L. No. 102-66, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.); Jay W. Waks, Workers' Rights Now Extend Overseas, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 23, 1991, at 16;
Orleans, supra note 81, at 147 n.4.
115. Older Americans Act Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-459. Congress did not engage in
additional hearings in order to determine the merit of expanding Title VII's protections. The cavalier
amendment of Title VII's territorial reach concerned Representative William Goodling (R-PA) who
stated: "[A] far-reaching change in employment discrimination law is being undertaken with no pretense
of substantive consideration in the legislative process .... [H]earings on an issue of this impor-
tance-extension of an American law to other countries and all the potential problems that may
entail-would have been useful." 137 CONC. REC. H3934 (daily ed. June 5, 1991) (Statement of Rep.
Goodling).
116. § 109(b)(1)(B), 105 Stat. at 1077 (1991).
117. "Commerce" is defined in § 2(6) of the Act as:
[Tirade, traffic, commerce, transportation, or communication among the several States, or
between the District of Columbia or any Territory of the United States and any State or other
Territory, or between anyforeign country and any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia,
or within the District of Columbia or any Territory, or between points in the same State but
through any other State or any Territory or the District of Columbia or any foreign country.
29 U.S.C. § 152(6) (1988) (emphasis added).
118. Nothstein & Ayres, supra note 7, at 24 ("Contrary to the Board's belief in RCA, neither Benz
nor its prolific progeny address the issue of whether the Labor Management Relations Act applies or
can be applied to American employees working on foreign soil for an American employer."); Diller,
supra note 51, at 1470-73 & nn. 32-50.
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scenarios are governed by the existing case law, it is helpful to keep the
following three variables in mind: 1) the nationality of the employer; 9 2)
the situs of the underlying activity in controversy; 20 and 3) the nationality
of the employees.
12 1
The Benz line of cases is usually cited as authority that the NLRA is strictly
territorial in scope. 122 These maritime cases involved foreign-flag ships that
were temporarily docked at American ports. Questions of NLRA application
arose when American unions took action with regard to the ships' foreign
crews. In Benz, an American union picketed a foreign ship in support of a
strike by the ship's foreign crew members. 2 3 The Supreme Court held that
the picketing was outside of the jurisdiction of the Labor Management
Relations Act ("LMRA"). 124 The Court noted that the only American
connections with the controversy were the American labor union and the
United States port. These contacts were deemed insufficient by the Court to
mandate application of the LMRA,'25 which was created as "'a bill of rights
both for American workingmen and their employers."'26
Six years later, the Benz holding was followed in two cases that were
decided by the Court on the same day. In McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de
Marineros de Honduras,'27 the Court considered whether the NLRA was
applicable in companion cases involving the organization of foreign crews on
vessels owned by foreign subsidiaries of United States corporations.'2 8 The
NLRB had held that the Act applied, and upon the petition of the National
119. It is important to note that employers are normally the defendants in actions brought under the
NLRA. For the NLRA to apply, the employer in question must fall under the regulatory scope of the
Act. No specific language in the Act indicates whether foreign employers are subject to the Act's
provisions, so deferral to the general principles of extraterritorial jurisdiction is necessary. If the
employer in question is not American, or the subsidiary of a American parent company, the United
States cannot claim jurisdiction under the nationality principle. As mentioned earlier, the courts have
not used the effects doctrine, or similar balancing tests, to extend employment laws transnationally. It
appears that the only time the Act will govern the conduct of a foreign employer is when that
employer's activity was conducted within the territorial boundaries of the United States. Therefore, in
consideiing the extraterritorial scope of the NLRA, this Note is primarily concerned with the actions of
American employers.
120. If the location of the activity at issue is within the territory of the United States, then there is
no extraterritorial question. Thus, the cases concerning whether the NLRA extends abroad must contain
activity that takes place, at least in part, outside of the territorial boundaries of the United States.
121. Generally, the cases agree that the NLRA was passed for the purpose of furthering the American
economy by ensuring the rights of American employees. Therefore, as shown in the discussion that
follows, disputes that appear to have no impact on American employees or the American economy,
generally have been held to be outside the regulatory scope of the NLRA.
122. The Benz line of cases includes: Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138 (1957),
McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10 (1963), and Incres Steamship
Co. v. International Maritime Workers Union, 372 U.S. 24 (1963).
123. Benz, 353 U.S. at 139-42.
124. Id. at 146-47. The LMRA includes the NLRA, and future cases denying extraterritorial
application of the NLRA have cited Benz as directly controlling authority.
125. Id. at 142.
126. Id. at 144 (emphasis in original) (quoting Chairman Hartley, coauthor of the Act, H.R. Rep. No.
245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1947)).
127. McCulloch, 372 U.S. 10 (1963).
128. Id. at 11-13.
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Maritime Union, had ordered a representation election.'29 The district court
affirmed the Board, 3 ' and the Second Circuit reversed. 31 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari to resolve the disagreement.'32 The Court's opinion
paid lip service to Congress' authority to enact a law to regulate facts such
as those before it in McCulloeh.3 3 The Court then turned to the threshold
question in the case-whether Congress had indeed enacted such a law by
creating the NLRA.' 34 Writing for the majority, Justice Clark stated:
The presence of such highly charged international circumstances
brings to mind the admonition of Mr. Chief Justice Marshall in The
Charming Betsy, that "an act of congress ought never to be construed to
violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains ...."
We therefore conclude, as we did in Benz, that for us to sanction the
exercise of local sovereignty under such conditions in this "delicate field
of international relations there must be present the affirmative intention of
the Congress clearly expressed." Since neither we nor the parties are able
to find any such clear expression, we hold that the Board was without
jurisdiction to order the election.'35
Similarly, in Incres Steamship Co. v. International Maritime Workers
Union, 36 an American union was picketing a foreign ship docked in a
United States port. The picketing was part of the union's attempt to organize
the ship's foreign crew.'37 Citing Benz and McCulloch, the Court found the
NLRB to be without jurisdiction to order a representation election.' 38 In
particular, the Court stated that with regard to the Benz line of cases, "[t]he
Board's jurisdiction to prevent unfair labor practices, like its jurisdiction to
direct elections, is based upon circumstances 'affecting commerce,' and we
have concluded that maritime operations of foreign-flag ships employing alien
seamen are not in 'commerce."
1 39
In Benz, McCulloch, and Incres, the issue was whether the NLRA applied
to a situation involving foreign employees and a foreign boat, docked at a
United States port. Even though the boats were docked at American ports, the
Court in these cases considered the true situs of the claims to be the ships
themselves. Thus, in the Benz line of cases, all three variables were foreign.
As such, the Court had little difficulty deciding that the NLRA did not apply.
129. United Fruit Co., 134 N.L.R.B. 287, enforced subnom. Empresa Hondurena de Vapores, S.A.
v. McLeod, 200 F. Supp. 484 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), rev'd, 300 F.2d 222 (2d Cir. 1962), vacated subnom.
McCulloch v. Socieded Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10 (1963).
130. McLeod, 200 F. Supp. 484.
131. McLeod, 300 F.2d 222.
132. McLeod v. Empresa Hondurena De Vapores, S.A., 370 U.S. 915 (1962) (cert. granted).
133. McCulloch, 372 U.S. at 17, 22.
134. Id. at 19, 22.
135. Id. at 21-22 (citations omitted) (quoting Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch)
64, 118 (1804) and Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138, 147 (1957)).
136. Incres Steamship, 372 U.S. 24 (1963).
137. Id. at 25-26.
138. Id. at 27.
139. Id.
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Despite the accommodating facts, the Benz line of cases have been cited for
the general proposition that the NLRA does not extend extraterritorially 40
In some later maritime cases, the international contacts involved were not
as substantial as those in Benz, Incres, and McCulloch, and the Court,
therefore, needed to hone further its position on the extraterritoriality of the
NLRA. In a 1970 case, International Longshoremen's Ass'n Local 1416 v.
Ariadne Shipping Co.,' 4' an American union was picketing foreign-flag
ships in United States ports in protest of substandard wages that were paid to
non-union, but American, longshoremen.' 42 This time the Court, through
Justice Brennan, affirmed Board jurisdiction under the NLRA.' 43 Distin-
guishing the case from the Benz line of cases, Brennan noted:
The American longshoremen's short-term, irregular and casual connection
with the respective vessels plainly belied any involvement on their part
with the ships' "internal discipline and order." Application of United States
law.. ., accordingly, would have threatened no interference in the internal
affairs of foreign-flag ships likely to lead to conflict with foreign or
international law. We therefore find that these longshore operations were
in "commerce" within the meaning of § 2(6). 44
Three years after Ariadne Shipping, the Court was again confronted with a
Benz like case in Windward Shipping Ltd. v. American Radio Ass'n.
14 1
Noting that the picketing was in protest of substandard wages paid to foreign
seamen employed by foreign shipowners, the Court cited Benz and McCulloch
and denied NLRB jurisdiction. 46 More importantly, the Court, through
Justice Rehnquist, articulated what it saw to be the key factors which, when
present, led to NLRA jurisdiction, but when absent, foreclosed application of
the NLRA: "Virtually none of the predictable responses of a foreign
shipowner to picketing of this type, therefore, would be limited to the sort of
wage-cost decision benefiting American workingmen which the LMRA [or
NLRA] was designed to regulate. This case, therefore, falls under Benz rather
140. Cleary v. United States Lines, Inc., 555 F. Supp. 1251, 1259 n.2 (1983) af'd, 728 F.2d 607 (3d
Cir. 1984). It is also because of their accommodating facts that some commentators have argued that
the Benz line of cases have been given too much precedential value and that the extraterritoriality of the
NLRA is an open question. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
141. Ariadne Shipping, 397 U.S. 195 (1970).
142. Id. at 196-99.
143. Id. at 200.
144. Id. In a case similar to Ariadne, NLRB v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n ("ILA"), 332
F.2d 992 (4th Cir. 1964), the fact pattern boiled down to unionized American workers refusing to unload
a foreign ship while it was docked at a United States port. Id. Their refusal was predicated on a boycott
of ships that were engaged in trade with Cuba. The Fourth Circuit denied Board jurisdiction because
the controversy in question was not related to a "labor dispute." Id. at 995-96. Prior to making this
ultimate determination, however, the Fourth Circuit ruled that the NLRA applied to the case. The court
distinguished the facts before it from the Benz line of cases by pointing out that the real activity at issue
was the politically motivated conduct of American employees. Id. Further, the court noted that the case
did not involve "shipboard labor relations" but instead was about the conduct of the unloaders on a
United States dock. Id. So, as in Ariadne Shipping, the core issue in this case was the application of the
Act to American employees with respect to their actions taking place on United States shores.
145. Windward Shipping, 415 U.S. 104 (1974).
146. Id. at 112-15.
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than under Ariadne."'14 In other words, the Court stated that it was looking
for conduct, the direct effect of which would impact American employees or
the American economy.'48
While many of the cases considering the extraterritorial application of the
NLRA involved maritime operations, there have been a few cases before the
Board that have involved more traditional employment settings. 49 RCA
OMS, Inc. 50 and GTE Automatic Electric, Inc. 51 may be examples of
cases where the "true" extraterritorial application of the NLRA was consid-
ered. In these cases, American unions sought to represent American
employees working for overseas subsidiaries of United States corporations. In
RCA, the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO ("IBE")
sought to represent American employees of Operation and Maintenance
Service, Inc., a subsidiary of RCA, a Delaware corporation. The employees
that the union sought to organize worked at five sites in Greenland, a
possession of Denmark governed as a Danish county. The employees in
question were required to have United States government security clearance,
were hired in and paid from the United States, and returned to the United
States upon completion of their jobs.'52 Despite these facts, the Board held
that Greenland did not come within the jurisdiction of the NLRA.'53
Similarly, in GTE, the IBE sought to bargain for all of the telephone
equipment installers employed by the company, including those employed by
GTE Iran Inc., on a project that was being performed in Iran.154 The Board,
citing RCA and Benz, held "[i]t is clear that employees in Iran are not within
the jurisdiction of the Act. Accordingly, we find that telephone equipment
147. Id. at 115.
148. See Ross, supra note 78, at 67.
The idea that the courts are looking for impact either on American workers or on the United States
economy is further supported by cases like United Fruit Co., 159 N.L.R.B. 135 (1966), and National
Maritime Union of America, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 267 F. Supp. 117 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). In both of these
actions, the Board refused jurisdiction in disputes involving foreign employees working for a United
States corporation in the Panama Canal zone. Because the Board exercised its discretion to refuse
jurisdiction, the actual issue of whether or not the NLRA applied to these disputes was left undecided.
In Contact Services, 202 N.L.R.B. 156 (1973), however, the Board considered facts substantively similar
to those in United Fruit and National Maritime Union. In so doing, the Board held that the NLRA did
apply but that it was refusing jurisdiction out of respect for foreign policy considerations that might be
involved.
Though the United States often considers itself to have a substantial interest in the Panama Canal
zone, labor practices in the zone would certainly have only a negligible effect, if indeed they have any
effect at all, on the American economy. Therefore, the feelings articulated by the Court in Windward
Shipping appear to have been present in these prior decisions in which the Board refused to exercise
extraterritorial jurisdiction under the NLRA.
149. By reference to "more traditional employment settings" that might represent "true" questions
of the extraterritorial application of the NLRA, this Note means to consider those cases where an
American company, or subsidiary, employs American citizens outside of the territory of the United
States.
150. RCA, 202 N.L.R.B. 228 (1973).
151. GTE, 226 N.L-.1B. 1222 (1976).
152. RCA, 202 N.L.R.B. at 228.
153. Id. The Board did not refuse to exercise jurisdiction, but rather held that it had no jurisdiction
under the NLRA to consider the dispute presented in RCA. Id.
154. GTE, 226 N.L.R.B. at 1222.
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installers employed on projects in Iran or other foreign countries outside the
United States are not within the [collective bargaining] unit."'55
The Board was a little more lenient in Freeport Transport, 1 6 a case that
differed only slightly from RCA. An American employee, Robert Carr, was
working for Freeport Transport, a Pennsylvania corporation, both in its
American locations and in its Ontario terminal. The Board noted that Mr. Carr
spent about three-fourths of his time in the United States, and never went
more than forty-five miles into Canada. Mr. Carr alleged that he was fired by
the company because of his involvement with the Teamsters, and as such he
claimed that the company violated Sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) of the
NLRA.' 57 The Board distinguished RCA and found "the American connec-
tion sufficient to establish that Respondent is an employer engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act, and thus to
warrant attachment of the Board's jurisdiction to this case."' 58 In essence,
the Board felt that it was dealing with an American employer, an American
employee, and for all practical purposes, activity that took place within the
United States. 9
Whether or not it is accepted that the Benz line of cases is generally
controlling in this area, the question of the NLRA's extraterritorial reach
appears to have been foreclosed. Looking to the rationale stated in Windward
Shipping, the courts and the Board seem content to apply the Act only to
those disputes which will have an impact on American employees and the
American economy. Comparing the RCA and Freeport Transport cases
illuminates the conclusion that a dispute affecting American employees is not
enough; there must be a corresponding impact on the United States labor
market for the Act to apply. 60 It must be remembered, however, that the
155. Id. at 1223.
156. Freeport Transport, 220 N.L.R.B. 833 (1975).
157. Id. at 833.
158. Id. at 834.
159. The Board was careful to hedge its finding of jurisdiction with language suggesting that if the
facts were slightly more "Canadian," it would deny jurisdiction:
It may be that if this case concerned only a petition by the Union for certification as
exclusive bargaining representative of all the employees at the Ontario terminal--even as part
of an overall unit of all three terminals [of the company]-the Board would lack jurisdiction
because of the involvement of the working conditions of foreign employees, i.e., Canadian
citizens. What is involved here, however, is whether the Act's protection is available to an
American citizen and resident allegedly discharged for participating in an American
organizational campaign which for a time looked also to the organization of Canadians.
Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
160. This interpretation of the NLRA cases seems to suggest that the courts may be using a version
of the effects doctrine to reach their conclusions. The Eleventh Circuit explicitly used this version of
the effects doctrine when it decided Dowd v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 975 F.2d 779 (11th
Cir. 1992). In that case, the Board had petitioned for an injunction, alleging that the International
Longshoremen's Association ("ILA") had violated the NLRA by inducing Japanese unions to engage
in an illegal secondary boycott. The District Court issued the injunction and the ILA appealed, claiming
among other things that the conduct in question was outside the jurisdictional scope of the NLRA. The
Eleventh Circuit affirmed the District Court noting that a substantial amount of the conduct in question
took place within the United States. Nonetheless, the court went on to describe the effects doctrine as
it applied to the Sherman Act, the Securities and Exchange Act, and the Commodity Exchange Act. In
the same paragraph, the court stated "[s]ince the object and effect of the conduct in question was to
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"true" decisions regarding the extraterritoriality of the NLRA are only Board
decisions. As such, the substance of their holdings is subject to later reversal
by the courts or the Board itself.' 6' Furthermore, there is always the
possibility that a piece of legislation like the Workplace Democracy Act
162
will be implemented by Congress.
III. POTENTIAL RAMIFICATIONS OF NLRA EXTRATERRITORIALITY
The courts and the Board have refused to extend the NLRA extraterritorially
despite the wide range of presented case scenarios in which the issue has
arisen. As was earlier discussed, however, Congress has recently overruled the
territorial limitations imposed by the courts on two prominent employment
statutes.' 63  Before considering similar legislative preemption with the
NLRA, Congress must appraise a number of important issues. These issues
can loosely be grouped into two categories, jurisdictional considerations, and
practical considerations.
A. Jurisdictional Considerations
1. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Subject matter jurisdiction defines the authority of a particular adjudicative
body to hear certain types of cases. As seen above, the Board and courts have
determined that the NLRA does not grant them subject matter jurisdiction to
decide extraterritorial disputes. This determination is entirely consistent with
the language, history, and purpose of the Act.
The underlying purpose of the NLRA is not difficult to discover. In
enacting the Wagner Act 164 in 1935, Congress sought to alleviate industrial
conflicts between labor and management that interfered with the free flow of
intrastate and foreign commerce. 65 To achieve this goal, the Act was
implement a secondary boycott within the United States, we do not believe the location of that conduct
is determinative." Id. at 790.
161. Contrary to the courts, the Board does not generally consider itself to be precedentially bound
by its earlier decisions. Given the fact that the political makeup of the Board changes with the
Presidential Administration, this policy has led to some see-saw results in many labor issues. A good
example of this can be seen by looking at the Board's holdings with regards to misrepresentations made
by employers or unions during the course of an election campaign. In Midland National Life Insurance
Co., 263 N.L.R.B. 127 (1982), the Board's opinion gives a clear description of its conflicting opinions
on this issue.
162. H.R. 6046, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992).
163. See supra notes 92-96, 114-16 and accompanying text.
164. 49 Stat. 449 (1935).
165. Some commentators suggest that the "obstruction to the free flow of commerce" language in
the NLRA's history is largely pretextual. That language exists to support Congress' authority to enact
such legislation under its Commerce Clause power. The real motivating factor behind the statute is
simply the intolerable working conditions that existed in America in the early to mid-1930's. With the
country submerged in the depths of the Depression, Congress sought not only to improve working
conditions, but to increase the spending power of workers, hoping to stimulate the economy. For a good
discussion of the enactment of the NLRA, see Currie, supra note 20, at 47-51. ("'The inequality of
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constructed to promote equal bargaining power between labor and manage-
ment. 66 Other than its broad definition of the term "commerce,"' 167 there is
no language in the Act or in its expansive legislative history which suggests
Congress intended, or even considered, that its provisions would be applied
extraterritorially.' 
68
The history of the Act is replete with references to "our country"; "the
whole country"; "all over the United States." . . . It was America whose
problems attracted the notice of Congress; America that elected the
congressmen who enacted the statute. The United States Congress was not
in the habit of enacting legislation to regulate the economies of foreign
nations. 16
9
The manner in which the Act has traditionally been applied also supports
the -idea that the NLRA does not grant subject matter jurisdiction over
extraterritorial disputes. Historically, the courts have interpreted the NLRA in
such a way as to maintain a high level of respect for the right of the employer
to retain control over its property. Thus, the Act could be said to guarantee
certain "Section 7" rights for employees that may not be interfered with by
employers. Other than engaging in conduct that would interfere with Section
7 rights, the employer retains free reign to conduct its business in the manner
that will most effectively maximize its profit margin.
One concrete example of the this idea involves union access to the
employer's property in organizational drives. In Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 7 °
the Court stated that the employer had a virtually absolute right to bar union
organizers from coming onto company property, despite the fact that one of
the most important Section 7 rights is the right of employees to organize.',
The Court reasoned that, except in extraordinary cases like logging camps, the
union had other reasonable means of communicating with employees in an
attempt to organize them. 7 1 In order to allow the employee's Section 7 right
and the employer's property right to exist conterminously, the Court held that
it was not an unfair labor practice for an employer to disallow union solicitors
on its property. 7 3 Moreover, the Court held that if the situation were like
that of a logging camp, it would then balance the right of employees to
organize against the employer's property rights. Only if the employee rights
bargaining power between employees ... and employers ... tends to aggravate recurrent business
depressions, by depressing wage rates and the purchasing power of wage earners....' The remedy:
.protection by law of the right of employees to organize and bargain collectively.") Id. at 48 (quoting
49 Stat. 449, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1958)).
166. More specifically, the Act guaranteed certain rights to employees, namely the right to organize
and "bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection." 29 U.S.C.
§ 157 (1988).
167. See supra note 117.
168. McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 18 (1962).
169. Currie, supra note 20, at 50 (citation omitted).
170. Lechmere, 112 S. Ct. 841 (1992).
171. Id. at 849-50.
172. Id. at 848-49.
173. Id. at 850.
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were weightier would the union gain limited access to company property for
the purpose of organizing the employees.
17 4
Another example of the Court's respect for the employer's right to run its
business is found in the Mackay Radio'75 doctrine. In Mackay, the Court
recognized that an employer has the right to hire permanent replacements for
striking workers in order to continue production. 7 6 By allowing an employ-
er to undermine the effectiveness of a strike through the use of permanent
replacement workers, the Court again allowed the right of the employer to run
its business to contravene a Section 7 right of the employees.'77
As mentioned earlier, the history and language of the NLRA do not
manifest a congressional intent to regulate labor disputes overseas. This fact,
taken together with the principle that the employer has free rein over all
activity not explicitly prohibited in the Act, inevitably yields the conclusion
that the Act does not apply extraterritorially. Finally, this conclusion is
buttressed by the fact that Congress did not equip the NLRB, the sole
administrative body charged with implementing the NLRA, with adequate
powers or authority to execute the Act's provisions in an international
setting. 71
2. Personal Jurisdiction
Personal jurisdiction refers to the authority of a court to issue a binding
judgment on a particular party. The traditional test of personal jurisdiction
from International Shoe Co. v. Washington 79 requires that the defendant
have sufficient "minimum contacts" with the forum such that the maintenance
of a suit against the party in that jurisdiction does not offend the notions of
fair play and justice. 80
The defendant in most labor disputes will be the employer. The employer
in extraterritorial cases will likely be the foreign subsidiary of a multinational
corporation. Trying to establish minimum contacts between the foreign
subsidiary and the United States could pose some problems. The argument
could be made that the subsidiary sells goods in the American marketplace,
and, by virtue of that fact, it has sufficient contacts such that it would not be
unfair for it to be sued in the United States.' Another argument could be
made that the subsidiary is actually an "alter ego" of the parent company.
174. Id. at 848.
175. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 0.S. 333 (1938).
176. Id. at 345-46.
177. 29 U.S.C. § 157.
178. See infra notes 194-211 and accompanying text.
179. International Shoe, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
180. Id. at 316.
181. This reasoning was rejected in Asahi v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987). In Asahi, the
plaintiff was the victim of a motorcycle crash. The crash was caused by a blown tire. The plaintiff sued
the tire manufacturer who, in turn, sought indemnification from a Japanese tube manufacturer. Id. at
105-08. The Court held that personal jurisdiction over the Japanese company could not be established
in California. The Court stated that even if minimum contacts were present, it would not be reasonable
to entertain personal jurisdiction over the foreign company. Id. at 116.
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Because of the substantial involvement of the parent company in the affairs
of the subsidiary, it is not unfair for the subsidiary to be sued in the United
States. Even assuming that these arguments are accepted to establish personal
jurisdiction for United States purposes, they will not be very persuasive to
foreign sovereigns who view the, subsidiaries as local companies.'82 "[I]t is
generally accepted internationally that the nationality of a company is
determined by its place of incorporation .... [E]ven where nationality is a
legitimate basis for extraterritorial jurisdictions, it must remain subject to the
primacy of the laws and the policies of the territorial state."' 83
The personal jurisdiction issue can become even more strained when foreign
labor organizations are parties or potential parties to the dispute. Even if there
are sufficient minimum contacts between the foreign union and the United
States to warrant personal jurisdiction, if the union does not voluntarily
consent to such jurisdiction, an embarrassing confrontation could ensue.8 4
3. Conflicts of Jurisdiction
The final jurisdictional issue to consider is that which was raised in the
Introduction. Considering the case of American workers overseas, even if the
United States possessed prescriptive jurisdiction based upon the nationality
principle, a conflict of laws would exist since the host country would also
have jurisdiction based on territoriality.
There are competing views as to how jurisdictional conflicts should be
settled. Many states adhere strictly to the idea that territoriality is the
preferred, and best, basis for jurisdiction. Other states, and the Restatement,
recognize that there are often more in-depth policy issues at hand. In general,
the Restatement imposes an obligation of "reasonableness" on any exercise of
jurisdiction." 5 In other words, even though a state may have a legitimate
basis for exerting jurisdiction, it should decline to do so when such exertion
would be unreasonable.8 6 Generally, "reasonableness" boils down to a
balancing of interests between the competing states. 87 Because of the effect
that labor policy can have on a nation's domestic economy as a whole, when
182. RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 414 (1986); Leigh, supra note 41, at 636-37; Zimmerman, supra
note 8, at 125.
183. Zimmerman, supra note 8, at 125 (alteration in original).
184. Nothstein & Ayres, supra note 7, at 53.
185. RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 403.
186. Id.
187. The Restatement suggests a number of factors for states with competing jurisdictional claims
to consider including:
(a) the link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state, i.e., the extent to which the
activity takes place within the territory, or has substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect upon
the territory; (b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity, between
the regulating state and the person principally responsible for the activity to be regulated, or
between that state and those whom the regulation is designed to protect; (c) the character of
the activity to be regulated, the importance of regulation to the regulating state ... (e) the
importance of the regulation to the international political, legal, or economic system.
Id. § 403(2).
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considering conflicting labor statutes, it will be difficult to find that the host
government does not have the more substantial interests at stake. Through
amendment, Congress explicitly rejected the notion that the Fair Labor
Standards Act be applied extraterritorially. This decision was based primarily
on respect for the right of a sovereign to control activities that will have a
substantial impact on its local economy.'88
As discussed previously, extraterritorial application of United States laws
has been met with substantial resistance by foreign states. 8 9 Employment
laws, in particular, tend to be more domestic in nature because they "are
usually based on historical, political and social factors peculiar to the country
involved."9 0 Thus, it would not be advisable for the United States to
overextend the reach of its labor policies. This is particularly true, as Justice
Marshall stated in his Aramco dissent, with a statute like the NLRA.' 9 Such
activity easily could be perceived as "imperialism" and provoke retaliatory
action. Retaliation could come in any of the earlier mentioned forms' 92 or
could come in a more reciprocal form. For example, "the application by
foreign countries of their labor law to foreign employees working in the
United States for foreign companies is certainly within reason."'93 A foreign
state might also attempt to hold an American parent company responsible for
the activities of its foreign subsidiary. Either of these actions would be
justified using the same logic as that supporting extraterritorial application of
American labor laws.
B. Practical Considerations: The Authority of the Board
There are a number of practical considerations weighing against the
extraterritorial application of the NLRA. Most of these considerations are
linked to the ability and authority of the Board to implement the Act's
mandates overseas.
In general, the Board is responsible for deciding two types of cases:
representation cases and unfair labor practice cases.' The division of labor
188. See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
189. See supra note 8.
190. Nothstein & Ayres, supra note 7, at 50.
191. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 111 S. Ct. 1227, 1239 (1991) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
192. See supra note 8.
193. Nothstein & Ayres, supra note 7, at 50.
194. The two types of cases are adequately summarized as follows:
A representation case involves a petition for recognition of a bargaining unit. The case may
concern the holding of an election for a representative labor organization, the recognition of
a labor organization as the excluive bargaining representative when two or more unions claim
such authority, or the decertification of a labor organization that does not represent a majority
within the bargaining unit any longer. An unfair labor practice case involves the investigation,
prosecution, and disposition of a charge by an employee or group of employees that an
employer or a labor organization has violated the NLRA.
Lisa A. Bireline, Comment, The Policy-Making Function of the National Labor Relations Board: The
Change from Adjudication to Rulemaking for Bargaining Unit Determinations in the Health Care
Industry, 25 CREIGHToN L. REv. 117, 119 (1991).
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on the Board is established by separating the Board's adjudicative and
prosecutorial functions. The five member Board is the adjudicatory body that
hears accepted unfair labor practice claims. 195 The General Counsel is the
prosecutor for the Board. The office of the General Counsel is supported by
a large staff that is divided between the Washington office and thirty regional
offices. It is through the regional offices that complaints are filed, investigat-
ed, and later presented to Administrative Law Judges and, possibly, the Board.
The regional offices also are responsible for processing representation cases,
an endeavor that involves setting the details of an election, and then carrying
out the actual election itself.9 6 Thus, the responsibilities of the Board, and
particularly the functions of the regional offices, often are capacious, yet
intimate to the particular working relationship at issue. It is easy to imagine
the additional strain that would be placed on the Board if the NLRA were
applied extraterritorially1
97
First and foremost, the administrative capacity of the Board would have to
be augmented to correspond to the expanded territorial base from which labor
disputes could arise. The Board would need to establish regional offices
within a reasonably accessible vicinity of any geographic territory that would
host American companies that employ American workers. The Board's
international regional offices would each have to be uniquely equipped and
staffed in such a way that they could deal effectively with the special
problems posed by the local conditions and laws. For instance, the staff
working at a particular foreign regional office would have to maintain a
thorough knowledge of domestic law and procedure. More specifically, the
Board might encounter problems in one of three areas: (1) investigation and
discovery, (2) establishment of an appropriate bargaining unit, and (3)
enforcement of judgments.
1. Investigation and Discovery
Almost any dispute brought before the Board will require some degree of
investigation on the part of the General Counsel's office before the decision
can be made as to how to resolve or dispose of the dispute. The Board is
therefore given broad investigatory powers by Section 11 of the Act. 9
Nothing in the Act, or in case law, however, tends to suggest that the Board's
investigatory powers extend overseas.'99 In fact, the Act seems to limit the
195. The Board has the option in both unfair labor practice cases and representation cases to act by
adjudication or rule-making authority. Historically, the Board has settled disputes in the adjudicative
fashion, and it only recently formally utilized its rule-making authority for the first time. See id. at 121-
22. See generally, Lori McLaughlin, Collective Bargaining Units in Acute Health Care Facilities:
American Hospital Ass'n v. NLRB, 33 B.C. L. REv. 316 (1992).
196. ARCHIBALD COX ET AL., LABOR LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 107-17 (1lth ed. 1991).
197. Goldberg, supra note 49, at 35.
198. 29 U.S.C. § 161.
199. Nothstein & Ayres, supra note 7, at 56.
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Board's investigatory powers to the territorial boundaries of the United
States.200 Furthermore, "the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provide
methods of discovery for obtaining information located abroad, do not apply
to administrative proceedings such as those conducted by the Board. '21
Even if one accepts that federal law permits the Board to utilize its
investigatory authority extraterritorially, complications may arise within the
domestic law system. Many states view the extraterritorial application of
United States laws as imperialistic.2 2 A United States court or administra-
tive agency ordering documents and subpoenaing witnesses would probably
be seen as particularly intrusive. Consequently, many foreign sovereigns have
adopted measures designed to frustrate "American imperialism." As described
earlier, some of these measures take the form of blocking statutes,0 3 which
explicitly restrict cooperation with discovery requests that are made pursuant
to what is viewed as an unlawful extension of United States law. Even
assuming the absence of blocking statutes or similar hostile feelings, a Board
member who is inexperienced in dealing with foreign laws may have difficulty
negotiating the different legal practices and procedures that exist in a foreign
state.
Service and process on a defendant are closely related to the investigatory
and discovery issue. Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide
means for service on defendants in foreign countries, unusual or uncooperative
domestic laws and procedures might complicate matters.
2. Determination of an Appropriate Bargaining Unit
One of the Board's primary functions in the representative process is
determining an appropriate bargaining unit.20 4 This task involves grouping
the employees who will be given the opportunity to be collectively represent-
ed by the petitioning labor organization. It is usually done on a case-by-case
basis.20 5 Commonly, the Board takes a number of factors into account,
including similarities among the workers with respect to the work they
perform, the skills they utilize, and the wages and conditions of employment
they receive. 6
Problems could arise for the Board in this area if it is confronted with the
not-uncommon scenario of an American-based corporation operating a foreign
200. 29 U.S.C. § 161(1) states: "Such attendance of witnesses and the production of such evidence
may be required from any place in the United States or any Territory or possession thereof, at any
designated place of hearing."
201. Nothstein & Ayres, supra note 7, at 56.
202. See supra note 8.
203. See supra note 8.
204. It is only incumbent upon the Board to establish an appropriate bargaining unit; the Act does
not require the Board to establish the most appropriate bargaining unit.
205. But see supra note 195.
206. There are a host of other factors the Board may consider including: (1) the frequency of contact
or interchange among the employees; (2) the geographic proximity (in the case of an employer with
multiple plants); and (3) the history of collective bargaining between the parties. Cox ET AL., supra note
196, at 283.
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plant that employs both American and foreign employees. In this situation, the
Board might be forced to establish a bargaining unit of, for example,
American clerical workers that would exclude foreign clerical workers who
perform exactly the same work under identical working conditions as their
American counterparts. This will place the employer in a difficult situation.
If a foreign union, in turn, represents the foreign clerical employees, the
employer is forced to bargain on two fronts for wages and conditions of
employment that affect the same group of workers. This process is inefficient
for the employer who would like to minimize the amount of resources it
utilizes in its overall bargaining process. There is also the possibility that
different contract terms will be negotiated for different clerical workers based
on their nationalities. The employer could thereby be forced to segregate
employees that are members of the same department. Overall, the employer
is vastly restricted in its ability to hire and utilize employees because of the
potential bargaining ramifications that might exist if nationalities differ within
departments.
3. Enforcement of Judgments
Finally, problems might arise for the Board as it attempts to enforce its
orders extraterritorially. The Act grants no enforcement authority to the Board
itself. Instead, Section 10 authorizes the Board to petition a federal court of
appeals for enforcement of its orders.2 °7 If the court of appeals agrees with
the Board and issues a judgment against the defendant, the next step will be
contingent upon the nationality of the overseas defendant. If the defendant is
of American nationality, the court might compel enforcement of its judgment
through attachment of property in the United States. Further, if the defendant
is the foreign subsidiary of a United States parent company, the court might
enforce its judgment against the parent.
If there are no substantial ties within the United States from which the
judgment can be fulfilled, or if the underlying order is of an equitable nature,
such as a cease and desist order, or an order to bargain, the only way to
satisfy the judgment would be against the foreign-based company itself. In
these cases, effective enforcement of the judgment would be directly
contingent on the actions and policies of the host nation. Most nations act in
accordance with the rule of reciprocity. 2 8 That is, most nations will enforce
judgments from other nations that do not seriously offend their domestic laws
because they want their courts' judgments to be enforced in return. The
problem with relying on the rule of reciprocity is that a state will often justify
not enforcing an extraterritorial judgment because there is a conflict with its
local law. Or, the host nation may view the American judgment as an
unlawful interference in its domestic affairs.2 9 It, therefore, may refuse
207. Cox ET AL., supra note 196, at 111-13; Nothstein & Ayres, supra note 7, at 57.
208. Nothstein & Ayres, supra note 7, at 57.
209. Id. at 57-58.
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enforcement without any good reason."' Even if the host nation does not
oppose giving effect to the United States-based judgment, enforcement may
be stymied anyway:
Generally, the courts in foreign countries have had difficulty weaving their
way through the tangled and confusing web of federal and state decisions
in the United States in trying to determine what effect the United States
gives to their nations' judgments ....
On the whole, except where a specific treaty or convention exists
between the United States and the foreign country, enforcement of
American judgments abroad tends to be difficult and largely impracti-
cal. 21
1
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
The past twenty years have witnessed a tremendous integration of world
markets. This trend is bound to continue, particularly with the opening of
markets in formerly inaccessible Eastern Block countries. The question of
extraterritorial application of laws will continue to be a major focus of the
international business community.
The goal of the United States should be to provide its multinational
corporations with predictable guidelines as to how to implement their overseas
operations. These guidelines, moreover, should be designed to alleviate or
minimize friction with other sovereigns in the international community. If this
goal is to be reached with respect to the extraterritorial application of federal
employment laws, the current policy will have to change.
The use of the two-tiered presumption has led courts, fairly consistently, to
deny extraterritorial application to most American employment laws. These
consistent results have not necessarily been accompanied by a sense of
predictability. The two-tiered test requires courts to make a subjective
determination as to whether a particular employment law would likely affect
international relations. Then, the courts must make a second subjective
determination as to whether Congress has exhibited the requisite intent to
apply the particular statute in question overseas. The potential for the two-
tiered presumption to yield inapposite results was realized in the Vermilya-
Brown and Foley Bros. cases." 2
The creation of a new test is in order. This new test should acknowledge
well-accepted maxims regarding the United States' view of international law;
maxims that originally underlay the two-tiered presumption. First, the test
must recognize that Congress, if it chooses, has the authority to legislate in
such a way as to ignore, or even to directly violate, international law.
213
210. Prohibitions on enforcing other states' judgments often will be mandated by the host countries'
drawback statutes. See Zimmerman, supra note 8, at 121.
211. Nothstein & Ayres, supra note 7, at 57 (citation omitted).
212. See supra notes 62-71 and accompanying text.
213. Professor Louis Henkin notes:
The language of the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution has been read to imply that laws
and treaties of the United States are not only supreme over state law, but are equal in status
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Thus, Congress can extend the coverage of United States laws extraterritori-
ally without considering the havoc such might wreak on the practices and
principles commonly followed in the international community. Second, the test
must recognize two canons of statutory interpretation that act as a buffer
against Congress' absolute authority to pass laws regardlesss of their
international implications: 1) Congress does not lightly enter into conflicts
with international law, and 2) Congress is primarily concerned with domestic
affairs.
The new test should also recognize ideas that the two-tiered presumption did
not acknowledge. The first concept builds on the canon that Congress does not
generally legislate in such a way as to violate international law. Given this
premise, it should further be assumed that Congress recognizes that there are
more preferable means of implementing labor policy in the international arena
than by simply extending United States laws overseas. More specifically,
diplomatic cooperation and compromise between national governments is
always preferable to unilateral action. 1 4 The existence of friendship,
commerce, and navigation ("FCN") treaties illustrates this point. United States
FCN treaties are designed to ensure that American nationals are accorded the
same treatment abroad as the host country extends to its own citizens.
"Applying domestic labor standards abroad undermines the premise of these
treaties. The FCN treaties are 'arrangements promoting mutually advantageous
commercial intercourse, encouraging mutually beneficial investments, and
establishing mutual rights and privileges.' Any attempts by the United States
to unilaterally apply domestic standards .. violates this spirit of mutuali-
ty.12
15
The second concept that the new test must acknowledge was illustrated by
the case history of the NLRA and many other employment laws. That is,
given the domestic nature of labor and employment laws in general, even
when they are applied strictly to American employees working abroad, a
strong potential for international conflicts remains. Therefore, the courts
should eliminate the first tier of the two-tier presumption. Courts should
and authority to each other. It is not unconstitutional for Congress to enact law inconsistent
with a treaty of the United States; it is not unconstitutional for the President, with the consent
of the Senate, to make a treaty inconsistent with an earlier act of Congress. And in the case
of inconsistency between a statute and a treaty, the later one will be given effect by the courts
and by the executive.
As with respect to a treaty, Congress can at any time legislate to supercede the development
[of customary international law] for purposes of domestic law.
Louis Henkin, International Law as Law in the United States, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1515, 1563, 1566
(1984).
214. In 1984, the member states of the OECD adopted a statement on Conflicting Requirements
Imposed on Multinational Enterprises that calls for 'cooperation as an alternative to unilateral action,'
and urges member states to 'take fully into account the sovereignty and legitimate economic, law
enforcement and other interests of other Member countries."' RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 403
reporters' note 1 (1986).
215. Zimmerman, supra note 8, at 125 (quoting Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation,
Apr. 2, 1953, U.S.-Japan, 4 U.S.T. 2063, T.I.A.S. No. 2863).
[Vol. 69:889
1994] EXTRATERRITORIAL EXTENSION OF EMPLOYMENT LAWS 919
assume that whenever the United States attempts to apply its labor policy
within the territory of another sovereign, conflicts will arise.
When considering the extraterritoriality of federal labor and employment
laws, courts should utilize a new test similar to the test espoused by Chief
Justice Rehnquist in Aramco.2 16 The presumption against extraterritoriality
should be single-tiered, always requiring Congress to have clearly expressed
its intent that the statute be given extraterritorial application.
In addition to the requirements asserted by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the
courts should further restrict their view of what qualifies as "the intent of
Congress clearly expressed." The courts should no longer engage in subjective
analyses such as looking for broad statutory definitions of "commerce."
Instead, the courts should require an explicit statement of intent that the law
applies to Americans working abroad, followed by language that: 1)
recognizes the fact that such application might interfere with foreign relations
but concludes that the policy issues behind the law are strong enough to
justify the possibility of international conflict; or 2) anticipates international
conflicts and provides a course of action to alleviate those problems.
By adopting the new test, the courts will neither restrict any powers of
Congress nor abandon any principles of international law. Instead, the courts
will require Congress to act clearly, and therefore rationally, when considering
the overseas application of federal employment laws. This will aid United
States multinationals in two ways. First, coverage of the laws to which they
are subject will be more readily ascertainable. This fact will facilitate
corporate decision-making. And second, United States multinationals will
presumably be engaged in a less-hostile global environment due to a
diminished perception of "American Imperialism" among the other states in
the international community.
CONCLUSION
Currently there are over three million Americans working abroad.217 That
figure is ever-increasing. Thus, the issue of how to regulate the employment
settings of those American citizens is of vital concern. Traditionally, the
United States has taken a hands-off approach, allowing the laws of the host
countries to govern the overseas employers of American workers. Recently,
Congress has flexed the intrusive muscle of the United States with respect to
two prominent federal employment statutes. Similarly, calls for the extraterri-
torial expansion of the NLRA have been made. What can been seen from
considering the hypothetical enlargement of the NLRA's territorial scope,
however, is that if such international encroachment is to be effected, it should
be done carefully. The courts must require clear congressional intent to extend
United States employment laws abroad. Presumably, informed, responsible
legislating will precede such clear intent. For the benefit of United States
216. See supra notes 106-08 and accompanying text.
217. Waks, supra note 114, at 16.
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multinational employers and employees alike, the courts must ensure that
Congress does not become extraterritorially "trigger-happy."
